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By Reginald C. Oh 
During the U.S. Supreme Court's 2003-04 Term, one of the more controversial cases on its docket dealt with the constitutionality ofPledge ofAllegiance recitations in 
public schools. Specifically, the issue in Elk Grove Unified Sch. 
Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004), was whether the in­
clusion of the phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Alle­
giance created a First Amendment Establishment Clause vi­
olation. When the Court decided the case on June 14, 2004, 
however, it strategically sidestepped the controversy entirely 
by dismissing the case for lack of standing, deferring, to an­
other day, a decision on the constitutionality of the Pledge of 
Allegiance. This article will examine briefly the Court's 
standing analysis, and then focus on the several concurring 
opinions in which several members of the Court explained 
how they would have ruled on the merits of the case. 
The case began when respondent Michael Newdow, an 
avowed atheist, filed a lawsuit in the federal district court chal­
lenging the Elk Grove Unified School District's practice of 
having school teachers lead their classes in daily recitations of 
the Pledge ofAllegiance. The Pledge ofAllegiance states, "I 
pledge allegiance to the Flag ofthe United States ofAmerica 
and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under 
God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." The current 
version ofthe Pledge was adopted by Congress in a 1954 Act. 
At the time the lawsuit was filed, Newdow's daughter was 
a kindergarten student in the school district, and his con­
tention was that the school district's policy of requiring his 
daughter and other school children to recite the Pledge is a 
form of religious indoctrination in violation of the First 
Amendment. In his complaint, the father challenged both 
the 1954 Congressional Act, and the school district's policy 
of teacher-led Pledge recitations. The federal district court 
rejected the father's contentions and dismissed the com­
plaint. The Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals reversed, holding 
that both the 1954 Act and the school district's policy vio­
lated the Establishment Clause. Subsequently, the Ninth 
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Circuit amended its first opinion, declined to determine the 
constitutionality of the 1954 Act, and held only the school 
district's policy ofrequiring recital ofthe Pledge to be an Es­
tablishment Clause violation. The Supreme Court granted 
writ ofcertiorari, and, by an 8-0 vote, reversed the Ninth Cir­
cuit decision. 
Five Justices voted to reverse the Ninth Circuit decision, 
concluding that the respondent lacked standing to bring the 
suit. Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Thomas concurred in 
the judgment reversing the Ninth Circuit decision. All three 
Justices disagreed, however, with the majority on the standing 
issue.They held that the respondent did have standing to bring 
the case, but voted to reverse the decision on the merits ofthe 
case, concluding that the ·'under God" phrase does not violate 
the Establishment Clause. Justice Scalia recused himself and 
did not take part in the consideration ofthe case. 
Justice Stevens wrote the majority decision, holding that 
Newdow did not have standing as a noncustodial parent of 
his daughter to challenge the school district's policy. Al­
though the Court acknowledged that the father did have 
standing under Article Ill's "case or controversy" require­
ment, it concluded that the father lacked prudential stand­
ing to bring the lawsuit. Under the doctrine of prudential 
standing, the Court has established "self-imposed limits on 
the exercise of federal jurisdiction." 124 S. Ct. at 2308. 
Specifically, the Court held that the father did not have 
standing to bring suit on behalfofhis daughter, because he 
did not have the legal right under California law to make de­
cisions on her behalf That legal right belonged to the father's 
ex-wife. Thus, the Court concluded that, since the father's 
standing was derived entirely from his relationship with his 
daughter, the fact that he did not have the requisite legal cus­
tody over his daughter negated his ability to bring the lawsuit 
on her behalf 
The Court's refusal to decide on the merits ofthe case cre­
ated a rather anti-climatic conclusion to the political and legal 
controversy generated by the "Pledge" case. Perhaps the five 
Justices who decided the case on standing are hoping that the 
case will be dismissed and will not come before the Court in 
the foreseeable future, thereby shielding the Court from un­
wanted political controversy. The concurring opinions written 
by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Thomas, therefore, 
provide the more interesting aspects of the decision, as they 
showed the varying approaches the Justices will likely take 
when and if this issue comes before the Court in the future. 
Justice Rehnquist contends that requiring students to re­
cite the Pledge does not violate the Establishment Clause be­
cause "[r]eciting the Pledge, or listening to others recite it, is 
a patriotic exercise, not a religious one. . . " 124 S. Ct. at 
2320. As a patriotic exercise, the Pledge for Rehnquist is a 
"declaration ofbeliefin allegiance and loyalty to the United 
States flag and the Republic that it represents." Id at 2319. 
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Essentially, Rehnquist contends that the inclusion of the 
phrase "under God" does not transform the Pledge as a polit­
ical oath into a religious invocation or prayer, and therefore, 
recital of the Pledge "cannot possibly lead to the establish­
ment ofreligion, or anything like it." Id at 2320. 
Rehnquist's analysis is flawed because it relies on simplis­
tic categorical reasoning to negate the religious/spiritual as­
pects of the Pledge. He seems to suggest that because the 
Pledge is about patriotism, it cannot be about religion, and 
the Establishment Clause cannot therefore be implicated. 
However, the patriotic nature of the Pledge, in conjunction 
with its reference to God, arguably does strongly implicate 
Establishment Clause concerns. Typically, the Establishment 
Clause is thought of as creating a separation between 
church/religion and state. The Framers were concerned 
about the coercive potential in the intermingling of religion 
and government. 
The Pledge, however, instead of instilling a beliefin the 
separation ofchurch and state, actually does the opposite and 
inculcates in children the belief that patriotism and belief in 
God are inextricably intertwined. For children required to re­
cite the Pledge countless number of times throughout their 
school going years, the Pledge may work to fuse in their 
minds allegiance to the nation with allegiance to God. In 
other words, the Pledge may teach children that pledging al­
legiance to the United States is tantamount to pledging alle­
giance and loyalty to God. In this way, it could be argued that 
the Pledge raises establishment concerns precisely because it 
invokes God as an integral part ofan act ofpatriotism. 
Justice O'Connor, in her separate concurrence, relies on the 
doctrine ofreligious endorsement to contend that the Pledge 
does not violate the Establishment Clause. Under the Estab­
lishment Clause endorsement test, government sponsored 
speech violates the Establishment Clause ifit "makes a per­
son's religious beliefs relevant to his or her standing in the po­
litical community by conveying a message 'that religion or a 
particular religious beliefis favored or preferred."' Id at 2321. 
A government endorsed message violates the Establishment 
Clause ifa reasonable observer would conclude that the gov­
ernment through its speech is sending a message to nonad­
herents that they are outsiders in the political community. 
For O'Connor, the question ofwhether the Pledge en­
dorses religion comes down to the question ofwhether the 
Pledge should be considered an act of"ceremonial deism." 
Acts ofceremonial deism are facially religious references that 
are employed primarily for secular purposes, and the Court 
has held that such acts do not present any real establishment 
of religion problems. Id. at 2323. Thus, for Justice O'Con­
nor, the national motto "In God We Trust" is an act ofcere­
monial deism, because the motto commemorates the role of 
religion in our national history, and does not invoke in a 
meaningful way "divine provenance." Id at 2322. 
Based on her analysis ofthe Pledge's history, its absence of 
worship or prayer, its absence to any particular religion, and 
its minimal religious content, Justice O'Connor concludes 
that it is an act ofceremonial deism and therefore does not 
convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief 
is favored or disfavored. First, she emphasizes that in a fifty­
year span, the Pledge has become a routine ceremonial act of 
patriotism, in which "countless schoolchildren recite it daily." 
Id at 2323. Moreover, for O'Connor, the fact that in the 
fifty-year history of the Pledge, it has only been legally chal­
lenged three times supports her conclusion that the Pledge 
has become a routine, secular, and ceremonial act ofpatrio­
tism that cannot be viewed as endorsing a particular religious 
belie£ Id at 2324. 
Second, she contends that a reasonable observer would not 
view the Pledge as prayer or worship, nor would a reasonable 
observer see the Pledge as a "serious invocation ofGod or as 
an expression ofindividual submission to divine authority." Id 
at 2325. Third, the reference to God in a general way suggests 
that a reasonable observer would not conclude that the Pledge 
in any way is favoring or disfavoring particular religious beliefs 
or sects. Finally, she concludes that the Pledge has only a min­
imal reference to God, and the brevity ofthe reference strong­
ly suggests that it is a ceremonial exercise that does not con­
vey a message ofreligious endorsement. 
O'Connor's endorsement analysis is flawed because it el­
evates formalism over realism. The critical flaw here is in her 
use of the "reasonable observer" as the basis to determine 
whether the Pledge conveys a religious message. Although 
she does not explicitly mention the age ofher hypothetical 
reasonable observer, it seems fairly clear that the observer is 
an adult and not a child. Specifically, given that this case is 
concerned with whether or not the Pledge endorses religion 
among schoolchildren, arguably, O'Connor's analysis of the 
Pledge should have used the hypothetical reasonable school­
child as the basis on which to determine the effect of the 
message on its intended audience. 
When a reasonable adult may view the Pledge as merely 
a ceremonial reference to God, the critical question is how a 
school child will understand the message put forth by the 
Pledge. Given the impressionability ofschoolchildren, espe­
cially elementary schoolchildren, it would be much harder for 
O'Connor to contend that a reasonable child observer would 
view the Pledge's reference to God as minimal or as merely 
commemorating the role ofreligion in our national history. 
Moreover, the recitation of the Pledge in the school con­
text is very different from other acts ofceremonial deism, in 
which there are no elements ofrequired participation. No one 
has to pledge allegiance to a Christmas creche, for example, 
nor is one required to read and affirm the motto, "In God We 
Trust," stamped on coins. In this case, however, children are 
required to recite the Pledge and pledge allegiance to "one na­
tion under God." Justice O'Connor tries to diminish the coer­
cive nature ofthe recitation ofthe Pledge by noting that chil­
dren may opt out and refuse to utter the part of the Pledge 
that contains the "under God" phrase. But, in suggesting that 
children have the option of" opting out" ofreciting the Pledge, 
the forced recitation ofthe Pledge is creating exactly the situ­
ation O'Connor suggests is an Establishment Clause viola­
tion-it is treating those children who do not want to profess 
allegiance to a nation under God as "outsiders in the political 
continued on page 15 
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community" on the basis of their religious beliefs. 
Justice Thomas criticizes O'Connor and Rehnquist's 
opinions for failing to recognize the coercive and religious 
nature ofthe Pledge as it relates to schoolchildren. He con­
tends that adherence to a prior Court decision holding that 
a school prayer at a graduation ceremony violated the Estab­
lishment Clause would require the Court to hold that recita­
tion ofthe Pledge in schools similarly violates the Establish­
ment Clause. Moreover, Thomas contends that the coercive 
elements with the Pledge case are actually stronger than in 
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), because "a prayer at a 
graduation is a one-time event, the graduating students are 
almost (if not already) adults, and their parents are usually 
present. By contrast, very young students, removed from the 
protection of their parents, are exposed to the Pledge each 
and every day." Id. at 2328. 
Moreover, Thomas contends that the Pledge clearly re­
quires students to declare a beliefin "one nation under God," 
and that declaration is tantamount to making children profess 
a belief that "God exists," a religious act that the Court has de­
clared unconstitutional in other cases. However, while Thomas 
believes that the Pledge is unconstitutional under current Es­
tablishment Clause doctrine, he would ultimately uphold the 
constitutionality ofthe Pledge because he believes current Es­
tablishment Clause doctrine should be overturned, and that 
the Court should conclude that the Establishment Clause was 
meant only to restrain the federal government in establishing 
religion, and therefore, it should not apply to states. 
Although the Court never reached a holding on the sub­
stantive issue in the case, given that Newdow was dismissed 
for lack of standing, nevertheless, the concurrences in New­
dow gives us a glimpse into how the Court mav decide this 
issue in the future. . 
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